then recorded how several frequent pawners came in to fence wares that were obviously hot, a few even revealing how they burgled homes and businesses. The state requirement that pawners leave a thumb print at every transaction did not deter these individuals.
An earlier undercover operation in Fort Lauderdale, Florida, filmed and then aired on December 21, 1997, during the CBS network's "60 Minutes" program, involved detectives posing as homeless people trying to pawn computer equipment with stickers indicating that they belonged to a prominent local business ("Quick Cash", 1997) . Notwithstanding overt signs that the goods might be hot, staff at three of five shops accepted them, one even asking for computer monitors the next time.
Luring CBS to Fort Lauderdale was a series of investigative reports by Glover and Larrubia (1996) in a local newspaper claiming that city pawnshops routinely accept suspect merchandise. After sorting through 70,000 pawn tickets to identify and examine backgrounds of the 50 most prolific pawners, the journalists found three common characteristics: most were unemployed, 78 percent had arrest records (half of them for property crimes, most others for drug offenses), and all possessed a seemingly endless supply of things to pawn. A police survey of frequent pawners produced like findings in Portland, Oregon. It noted that 90 percent were chronic drug users with long criminal records, and that most were unemployed (Hammond, 1997) .
The combination of high arrest and unemployment rates among prolific pawners implies that pawnbrokers have a correspondingly high probability of receiving stolen goods from such people. However, without an indication of the proportion of prolific pawners in the whole population of customers, or of the share of their goods relative to all pawned items, it is hard to gauge the significance of Fort Lauderdale and Portland findings. Johnson and Johnson (1998) , for example, make clear that frequent pawners are not representative of the general clientele. Their interviews with 1100 randomly selected borrowers in 1997 show that most are employed males, usually high-school graduates, without bank accounts (Johnson and Johnson, 1998) .
In general, research by scholars and journalists suggests three things. First, pawnbrokers do have some role in recycling stolen goods. Second, frequent pawners present the highest likelihood of acting as main agents through which pawnshops acquire hot goods. Third, the volume and value of these goods may be substantially greater than the tiny fractions that have been proposed. Pawn data from Dallas, Texas, provide circumstantial evidence to support these suggestions.
Data from Dallas, Texas
In addition to data from interviews with nine imprisoned property offenders (confirming the findings of Cromwell (1991) and Richard and Decker (1993) on use of brokers), eleven pawnshop managers and a dozen police officers in pawn units in Dallas and surrounding municipalities, these data comprise three related components. First is a primary database of all pawn transactions recorded by the Dallas Police Department (DPD) during the six-year period from January 1, 1991 , through December 31, 1996 . Each transaction shows a pawn ticket number, a pawner identification number, shop identification number, transaction date, and classification code for items pawned. 4 The second component, devised to help us calculate transaction values, comprises 1000 randomly selected pawn tickets issued by 102 pawnbrokers during the first half of 1993. In addition to items in the primary database, each ticket shows the pawner's zip code address, age, sex, and race; the loan period, amount of loan, finance charge, description and quantity of items pawned, and whether the transaction involves a loan or sale. With these data we estimate mean dollar values for twenty-one items that together represent almost 70 percent of all pawned goods.
The third data component, designed to examine arrest histories, is sample data on 2000 pawners. These show pawner identification number, street address, age, race, gender, and state arrest record, if any. To create the sample we stratified the primary database into ten frequency-oftransaction classes (i.e., one pawn transaction during 1991-96, two transactions, etc.), and then randomly selected 200 individuals from each category. The selection provided a list of identification numbers that we then used to search through state and county public records for individual arrest information. Glover and Larrubia (1996) used a similar method. The difference between the two approaches is that we cover all pawners for six years, not just the prolific ones for one year.
The Evidence Connecting Pawnshops and Stolen Goods
These data show that Dallas pawnshops received more than 5.5 million items in pledge during the six-year period, or a daily average of 23 items per shop.
5 Table 2 indicates that about two dozen items made up more than 70 percent of the total, most in the categories of jewelry, electronics, tools, office equipment, and firearms. This distribution pattern is roughly similar to that reported by Caskey and Zikmund (1990) and also, as noted in the Appendix, to the composition of stolen goods. This similarity between types of items pawned and stolen is expected because the features that make some things better candidates for theft than others, i.e., easily concealed, removable, valuable, enjoyable and disposable (Clarke, 1999) , also make them good things to pawn.
The 5.5 million items were pledged by 523,000 different individuals during the course of nearly 2.9 million transactions (Table 3) . 6 We estimate the total loan value of these transactions at about $208 million in 1999 dollar terms, or an average of $73 per transaction.
7 This is near the $70 that Johnson and Johnson (1998) Frequent pawners generated a disproportionate share of this activity. The 14,500 people pawning 30 times or more, though only 2.7 percent of the total, were responsible for 29 percent of all transactions and goods, and 24 percent of total loan value. 8 This group, as in Ft. Lauderdale and Portland, also held a higher proportion of individuals with arrest records. Its members were two to three times more likely to have been convicted for theft, larceny, burglary or robbery than those who pawned once or twice. Nearly two-thirds of the 1100 individuals within the group who pawned more than one hundred times had arrest records, more than half of them for some kind of stealing.
Looking at the most prolific pawners, the top 100 individuals who each pawned more than 250 times, Table 4 shows 83 with arrest records. Of these, 58 had accumulated 300 convictions for property as well as other offenses, or an average of 5.2 arrests per individual, Most property crime arrests, 74 percent, were for theft, 11 percent for burglary of vehicles, 7 percent for burglary of homes or businesses, 5 percent for robbery, and the rest for forgery and car theft. Other infractions mainly involved drug possession (23 percent) or driving without a license (23 percent).
Among the 42 persons not apprehended for property crimes, 17 had no records while 25 had 49 convictions for non-theft infractions, or an average of 2 arrests per person. Very similar to the previous group in age, sex and race composition, arrests here were mainly for drug possession (40 percent) and driving without a license (14 percent). But it would be premature to assume that these people committed no property offenses. As we note in the Appendix, nearly three-fourths of thefts from households, half of burglaries, and a third of robberies were not reported in 1999. Employee theft, a prime source of stolen goods, usually goes unreported too. And for reported crimes, clearance rates are low in large cities: 15 percent for theft, 12 percent for burglary and 23 percent for robbery (U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation, 1995 Investigation, -2000 . That is, 85 to 95 percent of property crimes are not solved. This suggests that many thieves are able to evade arrest, a fair share of them are likely to be in the group of frequent pawners that do not have property-related arrest records, and a goodly proportion of things pledged by members of this group are unlikely to be their own property.
By the same token, however, it is equally premature to presume that all frequent pawners, or even just those with property arrests, systematically dispose of stolen goods through pawnshops. Although reliance on pawnbroker loans is an expensive method of personal finance, individuals may confront situations where this is the best source available to them. What our observations suggest is that although research by those who look only at the most prolific pawners may inflate the role of pawnbrokers in disposal of hot goods, evidence still indicates that more of these goods flow through shops than scholarly research has acknowledged. The amount may not be as high as 25 percent of total value, but it is certainly greater than the fractions of 1 percent noted earlier.
The Dallas Police Department, for example, reports recovery of $2.4 million in stolen property from pawnshops in 1997. This represents about 3.5 percent of the average annual value of transactions during 1991-96. 9 Given that police recover only goods with unambiguous markings that determine true ownership, it seems likely that the share of stolen goods is much greater, greater even than the 5 percent dismissed by Oeltjen (1996) .
What that higher share might be is uncertain. Caskey and Zikmund (1990) report pledge forfeit rates in three states ranging from 14 to 22 percent of loans, and 10 to 20 percent of loan value. Our interviews with brokers suggest 20 to 25 percent of loans. Johnson and Johnson (1998) indicate that 29 percent of pawners forfeited at least once during the year. Of more interest, they also report that while 23 percent of individuals who pawned only once lost their pledges, 34 percent of those pawning four times or more forfeited at least once, 20 percent at least twice. In other words, as might be expected if one suspects that the frequent pawner population contains many thieves, prolific pawners are much more likely to walk away from their goods than infrequent pawners.
Given the many legitimate reasons that people might have to forfeit, it seems unlikely that hot goods constitute as much as 20 percent of all things pawned. By the same token, high reported rates of forfeiture make it equally unlikely that they represent less than 5 percent -especially when 15 to 20 percent of transactions are straightforward sales of goods, not loans. 10 The actual proportion seems likely to lie somewhere in between. If it is in the vicinity of, say, 10 percent, then the annual value of stolen goods at secondhand market prices might average about $64,000 per pawnshop. Extrapolated to the universe of 15,000 brokers, the total approaches $1 billion. This is substantial in relation to pawnshop turnover because brokers make nearly as much money selling forfeited goods as they do collecting interest. 11 Income from interest and fees averaged $145,100 per pawnshop in 1997 or, extrapolating to 15,000 shops, a total of about $2.2 billion (U.S. Census Bureau, 2001b). Sale of forfeit property produced an average of $253,400 per shop, suggesting a net revenue of around $126,700 after deducting loss of capital.
12 For all shops, these figures imply a gross income of $3.8 billion and a net of $1.9 billion from sale of merchandise. That is, $1 billion may represent more than a quarter of the pawnbroking industry's gross, and more than half of its net proceeds from sale of property.
At the same time, if the total value of pilfered merchandise is close to our estimate of $40 to $45 billion per year, then this $1 billion also represents 2.0 to 2.5 percent of all stolen goods. And if, say, half the items are retained by the people who steal them, it represents 4 to 5 percent of all goods disposed. 13 This is a modest share of the whole market. But pawnshops are only one component of used merchandise trade. Excluding repair and other shops selling secondhand items as sidelines, the census counted an additional 105,000 used merchandise stores with gross sales of $8.3 billion in 1997 (U.S. Census Bureau, 2001e). If stolen goods comprised a quarter of these sales as well, then one could account for another $2.1 billion and thus another 8 to 10 percent of the market for stolen 6 goods. The entire used merchandise sector, including pawnshops, might then be handling $3.1 billion per year, or 12 to 16 percent of the market for hot goods.
Conclusions
Although our estimates may eventually prove inaccurate, there seems no way to circumvent a few essential facts. One is that pawnbrokers, as omnipresent today as McDonald's restaurants, offer thieves a potentially convenient method of disposing of merchandise, especially items with no obvious markings. Another fact, found in our data and by journalists in Fort Lauderdale and police in Portland, is that the population of prolific pawners contains a large segment of people with robust arrest records. Combined with findings from burglar interviews, this strongly intimates that the population contains a substantial corps of habitual thieves who actually do rely on pawnbrokers for their recurrent service needs. A third fact, as we have tried to show, is that a modest percentage of the total value of pawnbroker transactions is sufficient to constitute a noteworthy share of our estimated $40 to $45 billion per year in stolen property. Even if our numbers are very wrong, there is enough circumstantial evidence here to warrant much more scholarly research, the quantitative sort especially, on connections between pawnbroking (and other components of the used merchandise retail sector) and hot goods. This is our first conclusion.
Our second conclusion is that the idea of deliberately disrupting markets for stolen goods does not seem well founded. In the case of pawnshops, Sutton's (1998) notion that businesses can avoid buying such goods by use of closed-circuit televisions, photographs and/or signs is not convincing because these actions are the same or similar (e.g., fingerprints) to measures that most pawnbrokers undertake routinely. Such tactics and police oversight may have reduced the flow of stolen goods through pawnshops at different times, but there is no evidence to confirm this. More likely, given the criminal records of prolific pawners, is that they have not dissuaded thieves from availing themselves of pawnbrokers. One reason, proposed by Hall (1935) , may be that enforcement of pawnshop regulations is too perfunctory to interfere with receipt and disposal of stolen goods. Another is that enforcement has been effective, but only to the extent of displacing part of the trade to other, less regulated enterprises, such as secondhand, precious metal and antique dealers or, where these are also under perpetual scrutiny (e.g., Illinois, Washington), flea markets and the like. A third possibility, the most plausible, is that most stolen goods are not identifiable as such.
There are several dimensions to this issue. As discussed by Clark (1999) and Sutton (1998) , one is technical. Most stolen items are not unique, do not have serial numbers, engraved codes or other property identifiers, or else have markings that are easy to remove. Another dimension is social. Most households neither record serial numbers of what they buy nor engrave them and, together with firms, do not report their loss to police.
The third aspect, the most important, is economic. Because the annual volume of hot goods is large, perhaps measuring in the hundreds of millions of items, the societal outlay required to create a record for each reported item and, at the same time, a reference base for the billions of things that businesses buy legitimately, is larger. It is for the moment prohibitive. In other words, stolen goods are not identifiable largely because it costs too much to identify them. They are, as a result, invisible in the daily exchange of millions of secondhand items between sellers and buyers.
Viewed in this context, the claim that markets for stolen goods act as underlying incentives to steal makes sense only if one subscribes to the notion that these markets are clearly separate or separable from retail trade in general and used merchandise trade in particular. Because they are neither clearly separate or nor separable, because it is usually impossible to know what is or is not stolen, a recommendation to deliberately disrupt demand for hot goods is a recommendation to deliberately disrupt demand for secondhand goods in general. This is unwise counsel.
From this, our third and final conclusion is that wiser would be support of actions to render more efficient the monitoring of people and things circulating through pawnshops, secondhand stores and similar establishments. The premise here is that identification and apprehension of thieves need to remain the focus of police and criminologist attention. More efficient monitoring of suspicious pawners and goods, achieved through strengthened pawn details, speedier transfer of transaction records from pawnshops to police computers, accelerated analysis of the data, and similar means can help in this. To the extent that pawnbrokers cooperate with police in improvement of monitoring, these actions may also protect the interests of firms that prefer to shun hot goods.
The problem, now and in the past, is that pawn units (called details or squads sometimes) are relatively understaffed, partly because police departments are asked to concentrate on crimes against persons, partly because policy makers do not see gain from spending on data collection, and partly because most pawnbrokers object to the extra cost and intrusion into their affairs. The units, as consequence, are usually behind in data entry. Fort Lauderdale's pawn unit recorded less than 50 percent of the pawn information it received during 1995 . Dallas police recorded 100 percent of all information for only one continuous 12-month span during 1991-96, managing an average completion rate of 70 to 80 percent through the period. Consequently, items were often identified as hot after pawnbrokers disposed of them, and transaction trails that could justify surveillance of suspicious pawners were often identified after they ran cold.
Benefits of improved monitoring have already shown themselves through increased recovery and apprehension. Murray (1996) , for example, reports that police in Atlanta, Georgia, entered only 25 percent of transaction data in 1996. A year later, after installation of a computer system with electronic data transfer from brokers, police entered 100 percent of pawn information, reduced processing time from several weeks to 24 hours and increased recovery rates from 12 to 42 items per month (Murray, 1997) . In Florida, similarly, Perez (2000) reports a rise in recovery after the Broward County Sheriff established an automated pawn tracking database. The new system also helped catch 175 parole violators and 110 felons pawning firearms in 1998. By 2000, some 50 state and local agencies were using similar tracking systems, including the Florida Department of Law Enforcement (FDLE) which initiated a project to install a statewide database in that year.
In addition to property recovery and apprehension of criminals, there is also the prospect of using transaction data to map suspicious behavior in "real" time. People pawning twenty diamond rings or watches or electric tools or city street directories or anything else of value within a relatively short period, especially if encumbered with interesting criminal histories, earn immediate suspicion of stealing or of receiving hot goods. If the items are not reported stolen or if they lack markings, then arrest is not possible. But it is possible to conduct surveillance to determine whether initial suspicions are justified, whether there are networks of accomplices warranting police attention, or whether there are other ways to identify and maybe apprehend these or other thieves.
The prime obstacle to improved tracking is pawnbroker resistance. Rarely conceding the utility of anything but "article only" tracking to help identify stolen goods, brokers habitually oppose collection of personal information that might reduce the flow of patrons. In 2001, for instance, the Florida Pawnbrokers Association responded to the introduction of automated tracking by threatening to initiate legislation that would delete all customer data from pawn unit computer systems.
14 The association did not achieve this goal, but it convinced the legislature to reduce funding for FDLE's statewide database project from $1 million in 2000 to $275,000 in 2001, and then to zero in 2002. 15 Pawnbrokers are nowhere strong enough to eliminate police scrutiny. But as the industry organizes for common cause, strength such as that shown in Florida may spread. Helping in this is the ability of brokers to propagate image-enhancing media stories containing references to academic studies that point to minuscule quantities of stolen goods in their merchandise. Scarcity of proper research on the role of pawnshops and other secondhand stores in hot goods trade thus makes it easier for brokers to thwart efforts at improved tracking. Accordingly, the first conclusion put forward above, about the need for more scholarly research, is in our opinion the most important.
Turning to business, NRSS data intimate that gross losses from theft and fraud in the retail sectors it sampled, valued at prices sellers paid for them, came to $18.3 billion in 1999, or about 1.1 percent of the $1.74 trillion in total sales of these sectors (University of Florida, 2001).
18 Employee theft was responsible for $9.2 billion, shoplifters $6.8 billion, vendor theft $1.2 billion, and check and credit card fraud $1.1 billion.
19 Main items taken were clothing and shoes, compact disks, cassette tapes, video games, movies, over-the-counter remedies, health and beauty aids, automobile accessories, jewelry, hand tools, cigarettes, and batteries. Although the loss rate of 1.1 percent of sales held steady, the total value of goods stolen increased substantially in step with a 6.3 percent average annual increase in retail sales through the decade (U.S. Census Bureau, 2001a) .
There are no reliable data on loss recovery to help estimate net losses in the retail sector, and no reliable figures on the proportion of incidents reported which could help determine the share of losses already included in the UCRS. We therefore make assumptions. First we assume that the recovery rate for retail stores is 7 percent, the same as for theft in the UCRS and NCVS. This lowers merchandise loss from a gross of $18.3 billion to a net of $17 billion. Second, we assume that the $2.9 billion in losses reported by businesses and others in the UCRS are mainly reports by retail firms, and that they are already included in the $17 billion. Our estimate of the net value of goods stolen from households and from firms of kinds covered by the NRSS is then $24.3 billion, of which $7.3 billion in household losses and $17 billion in retail business losses. 20 To this we must add losses in retail sectors not covered by the NRSS with sales of $1.1 trillion in 1999, losses in manufacturing and wholesale trade with combined sales of $6.5 trillion, and losses in other sectors, especially from employee pilfering, in services and government. 21 With no better basis to guess, we assume that theft of goods is (relatively) negligible in government, services and other sectors that are merchandise poor and thus less exposed to removal of objects than retail firms. We assume also that net losses in manufacturing, wholesale trade and the balance of retail amount to 0.25 percent of their total sales of $7.6 trillion in 1999, or $19 billion. Adding this to the $24.3 billion lost by households and retail firms in the NRSS yields $43.3 billion, and the estimate range of $40 to $45 billion. , 1991-1996. These data are incomplete because the DPD gave data entry priority to weapons and items with unique identifiers, registering the remainder as time allowed, and because it recorded only the first item on each ticket before 1996. DPD guesses that it captured 70 to 80 percent of all transactions for the whole period. To adjust for this, we applied the mean number of items per transaction for 1996 to prior years. We make no adjustments for the DPD's failure to record all transactions. The data may thus understate the volume and value of pawnshop traffic by 20 to 30 percent.
5.
Transaction data show wide month-to-month variation in pawnbroker numbers, ranging from a low of 73 to a high of 123. Low figures reflect months when the DPD fell behind in recording data. High figures reflect months when it recorded almost everything, when licensed pawnbrokers that operate infrequently (e.g., jewelry and department stores) were unusually active, and when shops moving from one location to another kept both outlets open for a time. Adjusting for these factors, we use 108 as the average number of pawnshops in operation during the reference period.
6. For present purposes we treat each pawn ticket, which can record several different items, as one transaction. Although some individuals pawned enough different items to require issuance of more than one ticket for one transaction, these instances are rare in our data.
7.
We added 1 percent to actual figures for 1993 to estimate transaction values in 1999 dollar terms. The adjustment was derived from a weighted average of 1993-1999 changes in the urban consumer price index, as given in U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (1999), for jewelry and watches (-3.3 percent), video and audio equipment (5.2 percent), and photographic equipment (-3 percent). These three classes comprise half the goods pawned in Dallas.
8.
The proportion of total loan value is less than that of all transactions because average transaction value drops from about $100 for those pawning once to $56 for those who pawned at least 50 times. This drop stems from differences in item composition, especially jewelry, the most valuable class of goods. This class contains 32 percent of all items for those who pawned once or twice, 16 percent for those pawning 50 and more times.
9.
We estimate total loan value at $208 million, or $34.7 million per year. Loan value, in general, is between 30 and 75 percent of secondhand market value. Using 50 percent, the annual market value of pledged items is then $69.4 million. The $2.4 million in property
